The Mediterranean Energy Relations after the Arab Spring: Towards a New Regional Paradigm? by Sartori, Nicolò
 




The Mediterranean Energy Relations after the Arab






Centre de la Méditerranée moderne et contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 December 2014





Nicolò Sartori, « The Mediterranean Energy Relations after the Arab Spring: Towards a New Regional
Paradigm? », Cahiers de la Méditerranée [Online], 89 | 2014, Online since 01 June 2015, connection on
08 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/cdlm/7762 
This text was automatically generated on 8 September 2020.
© Tous droits réservés
The Mediterranean Energy
Relations after the Arab Spring:
Towards a New Regional Paradigm?
Nicolò Sartori
1 The Arab revolts,  started in Tunisia at  the end of  2010 and spread to the different
Mediterranean countries in the following months, have introduced a series of dramatic
political, socio-economic and security changes across the region. In Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya the  longstanding regimes led,  respectively,  by  Zine El-Abidine  Ben Ali,  Hosni
Mubarak and Muammar Gheddafi collapsed under the hammer-blows of the protesters.
The transformation processes prompted by the protests,  however, were not exempt
from setbacks,  as  confirmed by  the  difficulties  currently  experimented by  the  new
leaderships  in  consolidating  their  control  over  the  countries  and  in  leading  them
towards stable rule and prosperous socio-economic development.1 
2 The trajectories of the protests spread across the region show great uncertainty about
the nature,  the powers,  and the policy and strategic orientations of the new ruling
elites in power on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. This undefined political
situation risks to significantly impact on the future of  the relations between North
African countries and their European partners. Among the various sectors that could be
affected by the new political processes triggered by the Arab uprisings, regional energy
cooperation is certainly one of the most strategically relevant. 
3 The regimes previously in power in North Africa had established strong and profitable
bilateral energy relations with their key south European counterparts, which proved to
be a fundamental enabler of longstanding political and socio-economic stability both
on  the  northern  and  on  the  southern  shores  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  changes
introduced  by  the  Arab  revolts,  on  the  one  hand,  could  modify  the  traditional
intergovernmental relations, and establish new ‘north-south’ cooperation models to deal
with energy issues in the Mediterranean region. On the other hand these changes, by
weakening historical regional ties, could favour the emergence of new international
actors in the Mediterranean energy game.
The Mediterranean Energy Relations after the Arab Spring: Towards a New Regio...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 89 | 2014
1
4 Given these assumptions, the objective of this paper is not only to illustrate key aspects
of  the  geopolitics  of  energy  in  the  Mediterranean  region  and  to  analyse  the  main
energy cooperation patterns, but also to assess the potential changes –either positive
or  negative–  in  the  nature  of  the  regional  energy  relationships  triggered  by  the
transformations introduced by the Arab upheavals. The fact that the revolts have so far
produced  uncertain  and  heterogeneous results  in  terms  of  political  regimes,  not
resulting in a more free, democratic and prosperous Mediterranean region as expected
at  the  beginning  of  the  revolts,  makes  this  assessment  particularly  difficult  and
indeterminate. 
 
Energy fundamentals in the Mediterranean
5 From a methodological point of view, the paper intentionally focuses on the energy
relations  between  Europe  and  North  African  Mediterranean  countries.  This  choice
excludes Eastern Mediterranean and Levant states from the analysis, as at present they
are not relevant energy partners for the EU.
6 The Mediterranean region is an important energy area for two main reasons. First, the
Mediterranean Sea is a key transit area for oil and gas supplies that from the Middle
East, Russia and the Caspian reach European ports as well as the US market. Second, it
is  fundamental  for  intra-regional  trade  of  hydrocarbons  between  North  African
producers and South EU consumers.2
7 Every year, thousands of laden of oil cargoes and liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers
transit  across  the  Mediterranean  and  its  key  chokepoints:  the  Suez  Canal  and  the
Turkish straits. In 2012, about 2.97 million barrels per day (b/d) of total oil (including
crude oil and refined products) crossed the Suez Canal transiting both northward and
southward. It represents the highest amount of oil supplies ever shipped through the
Canal, making up around 7 percent of World’s seaborne traded oil. The majority of the
oil –1.66 million b/d– was sent northbound from the Persian Gulf towards European
and  North  American  markets,  while  the  remainder  –around  1.32 million  b/d–  was
Eurasian oil delivered southbound mainly toward Asian markets. In 2012, southbound
trade increased by  over  500,000 b/d compared to  the  previous  year,  mainly  due to
resumed  oil  production  in  Libya  after  the  civil  war.  In  addition  to  oil,  LNG  trade
represents an important portion of ships transit through the canal. Indeed, northbound
LNG flows increased from 8.8 billion cubic meters (Bcm) per year in 2008 to 35 Bcm/y in
2012.3 As for the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, in 2013 approximately 3.0 million b/d
flowed  through  the  two  Turkish  straits.  Oil  shipments  through  the  Turkish  Straits
reached their peak of over 3.4 million b/d in 2004, then starting to decrease due to
Russia’s decision to shift crude oil exports toward the Baltic ports and to the activation
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which started delivering part of the Caspian to the
Mediterranean bypassing the straits.4 
8 Despite these significant data, due to the unconventional energy revolution in place in
North America and to the impressive growth of  hydrocarbons consumption in East
Asia, the role of the Mediterranean as a transit region –though remaining critical in
terms of maritime security and environmental protection– is expected to progressively
decrease. The Mediterranean, in this context, will not play anymore a global role, while
it is expected to assume a regional relevance mainly for European consumers.
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9 The Mediterranean, however, will remain fundamental for the intra-regional supply of
hydrocarbons. In fact, three out of the five North African countries considered in this
paper  –Algeria,  Libya  and  Egypt–  are  net  energy  exporters,  and  their  oil  and  gas
production plays a significant role for European countries, particularly for those facing
the Mediterranean Sea.5 Algeria is a world-class gas player. Owning about 4.5 trillion
cubic meters (Tcm) of gas, Algeria is the ninth country in terms of reserves and the
tenth in terms of production, which in 2012 reached an output of 81.5 Bcm. Algeria
contributes to roughly 15% of total EU gas imports, and to 50% of Portugal’s, 41% of
Spain’s, 23% of Italy’s and 11% of France’s external supplies. Before the recent political
chaos,  Libya,  for its  part,  was a relevant oil  exporter,  holding the ninth oil  reserve
capacity in the World (48 thousand million barrels) and providing around 10% of total
EU oil imports. While the country is not a major player in terms of gas production and
exports –contributing to only 3% of total EU imports– it plays a significant role for the
energy security  of  Italy,  to  which it  provides  around 10% of  its  total  consumption.
Finally Egypt, that despite significant hydrocarbons production, due to huge domestic
consumption today contributes only marginally to Europe’s energy sector providing
LNG volumes. In addition, these three countries ensure energy supplies to their African
and Middle Eastern neighbours: Algeria, indeed, exports gas to Morocco and Tunisia,
while  Egypt  gas  volumes  reach  the  Levant  countries  –Israel,  Palestine,  Jordan  and
Lebanon– through the Arab Gas pipeline. 
 
European external energy action
10 The high level of dependence of Southern European countries on North African energy
resources  is  fundamental  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  energy
relations. Together with Norway and Russia, the Mediterranean is one of the three key
axes of the European external energy policy, in particular in the natural gas sector.6 
11 In general, the EU has demonstrated a limited capacity to engage these energy actors.
Single EU Member States, on the contrary, have developed strong bilateral ties with
these  strategic  partners.  The  provisions  of  Art. 194  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  indeed,
envisage shared competences between the EU and its  Member States in the energy
domain, allowing national governments to protect their own interests. This situation
contributes  to  reduce the cohesion and effectiveness  of  the EU action in this  field,
which varies also according to the specificities of each energy partnership.7
12 Russia and Norway are by large the main energy suppliers of the EU, jointly accounting
to 65% of Europe’s gas imports and 50% of its oil imports. Nine different EU countries,
including all the major European consumers (Germany, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands
and France), import gas from Norway, while eighteen of them are consume Russian gas.
8 With Norway the EU has developed strong and efficient bilateral energy relations that
integrate several cooperative processes and frameworks in which the Nordic country is
involved.  While  Norway  is  not  member  of  the  EU,  in  fact,  it  shares  about  75%  of
European legislation through its association in the European Economic Area, Schengen
Agreement, and European Free Trade Association. Also in the case of Russia, despite the
complex political  relations between Moscow and its  European countries,  the strong
energy interdependence between the  parties  favoured the  establishment  of  various
institutional energy cooperation mechanisms such as the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue,
the Early Warning Mechanism and joint structures and programs to manage energy
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relations. Finally, in order to diversify its energy sources, the EU launched a common
external  energy  policy  initiative  towards  an  emerging  energy  region  such  as  the
Caspian. Taking advantage of the vacuum of power that followed the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the EU has tried to develop a coherent cooperative approach with the
Caspian producers (Azerbaijan in primis). The launch of the INOGATE program and of
the Baku Initiative, as well as the development of the Southern Gas Corridor are all
initiatives that witness the proactive –though not always fully successful– energy role
of the EU in the region.9
13 The  situation  appears  different  when  it  comes  to  EU  energy  relations  with
Mediterranean  countries.  As  noticed  above,  indeed,  the  Mediterranean  is  not  the
predominant geographical priority of the EU’s energy endeavours, and the cooperative
schemes launched by the European Union towards the region appear more limited. This
situation  has  two  main  explanations.  First,  because  Mediterranean  hydrocarbons
supplies have a limited impact on Europe’s overall energy security compared to Russia
and Norway, and their relevance can be circumscribed to three main countries: Italy,
Spain and Portugal. Second, due to historical bilateral country-to-country energy ties,
as those developed by Italy in North Africa starting from the ’50s. In that period, energy
was regarded as a fundamental element in the bilateral relations established across the
Mediterranean. The action of the Italian energy company ENI and its Chairman Enrico
Mattei  is  a  case  in  point:  while  Mattei  became  famous  for  the  75-25%  contractual
formula introduced in Iran in 1957,  in reality,  the first  exploration and production
activity of the company in the Arab world started in 1954 in Egypt.10 
14 The peculiar nature of energy relations in the Mediterranean is strongly rooted in the
energy needs of both the North African exporters and the South European consumers.
15 Energy exporters depended almost completely on hydrocarbons revenues to remain in
power  and  to  ensure  socio-economic  stability.  This  condition  encouraged  the
authoritarian regimes of these countries to strengthen their longstanding bilateral ties
with traditional South European customers in order to secure and maximize energy
export profits.  As an alternative, these governments could choose to develop closer
energy relations with the EU. However, this option could significantly impact on the
behaviours and policies of these regimes. In fact, the EU often includes human rights
and  democracy  clauses  in  partnership  and  cooperation  agreements  with  third
countries,  as  an  attempt  to  promote  and  transmit  the  values  of  human  rights,
democracy, and the rule of law globally.11 As North African producers need stability and
predictability in their energy relations –in order to avoid exports and prices volatility,
to ensure stable cash flow, and to plan socio-economic and redistribution policies for
their  citizens–  in  case  of  restrictive  clauses  imposed  at  the  European  level,  they
generally prefer to engage with less demanding energy customers.
16 From  the  perspective  of  south  European  importers,  the  strong  dependence  on
Mediterranean  energy  supplies  encouraged  governments  to  maintain,  and  possibly
strengthen, their privileged energy partnerships with North African producers. These
historically  established energy relations  narrow the  present  and future  options  for
external  energy  policy  and  lead  to conflicting  preferences.12 In  this  context,  the
southern members of the EU are sceptical about pan-European initiatives that could
weaken country-to-country cooperation. 
17 Art. 194 of the Lisbon Treaty, establishing that EU policies “do not affect a Member
State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice
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between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” in fact
defends the willingness of EU countries to maintain sovereignty over their national
energy policies.13 These policies are often the result of different historic trajectories
developing  out  of  national  specificities,  including  domestic  resources,  geographical
location,  domestic  demand,  infrastructure  investments,  and  public  opinion,  which
make  it  extremely  difficult  for  EU  countries  to  converge  on  substantive  energy
objectives.  While  the  Commission  is  pushing  Member  States  to  operationalize  the
principle of solidarity in the energy domain, the primacy of national energy strategies
at the member state level still represents a decisive obstacle for all efforts to forge a
external energy action at the EU level. 
 
Energy cooperation in the Mediterranean
18 The combination of these approaches resulted in limited initiatives at the EU level to
engage Mediterranean countries on energy issues. The first attempts date back to 1972,
when the European Commission tried to integrate development concerns into existing
economic ties  with some Mediterranean countries.  European efforts  resulted in the
Global  Mediterranean  Policy,  launched  in  1976  to  institutionalize  relations  with
Mediterranean governments, mainly on general economic and commercial issues.14 The
success  of  the  initiative,  however,  was  limited  and  with  advances  in  European
integration  Mediterranean  partners  remained  substantially  marginalized  from
cooperation processes.15
19 More than twenty years after the Global Mediterranean Policy, the EU launched the
Barcelona  Process  (1995)  and  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  (EMP),  through
which it tried to develop a multilateral approach towards the region. The EMP covered
three  macro-themes:  political  and  security  dialogue,  economic  and  financial
partnerships and socio-cultural partnerships.16 Initiatives on the different policy areas
were envisaged to take place on two levels  –bilateral  and multilateral.  In 2007,  the
Ministers of  Energy of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,  taking part in the fifth
Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Energy, held in Limassol, launched the
Euro-Mediterranean Energy Cooperation.17 The Declaration included a Priority Action
Plan for Euro-Mediterranean Energy Cooperation, which identified three priority areas
for the period 2008-2013: 
- Ensuring  the  improved  harmonization  of  energy  markets  and  legislations  and
pursuing the integration of energy markets in the Euro-Mediterranean region; 
- Promoting sustainable development in the energy sector; 
- Developing  initiatives  of  common  interest  in  key  areas,  such  as  infrastructure
extension, investment financing and research and development.18
20 Despite  the  emphasis  posed  during  the  conference,  the  proposals  remained largely
confined at the declaratory level. 
21 In 2008 the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) re-launched the idea of a multilateral
commitment, but into an intergovernmental framework based on the principles of co-
ownership and variable architectures, and maintaining the legitimate interests of any
member of the UfM.19 From the beginning, energy cooperation was put at the core of
the UfM initiative: indeed, alternative energies –and in particular the Mediterranean
Solar Plan (MSP)– was among the six priority areas identified in the final declaration of
the Paris  Summit  of  July  2008.  The MSP is  a  very ambitious  initiative,  expected to
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ensure  20 GW of  new installed  electricity  capacity  by  2020.  The  UfM Secretariat  in
Barcelona has been tasked to act as a key facilitator for the process, setting up common
working  platforms  involving  the  main  institutional  and  private  stakeholders  (i.e.
Member  States,  European  Commission,  international  organizations,  financial
institutions, private companies, and civil society).20 The status of advancement of the
initiative  remains today quite  uncertain,  and despite  the direct  involvement of  the
European Commission through the project ‘Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar
Plan’ (PWMSP), the milestones identified by the medium term roadmap are far from
being achieved due to disagreement among the UfM members. The status of the MSP
Master Plan addressing the key details of the project21, to be submitted by mid-2013 and
not yet presented, is a case in point of such delays. 
22 In  parallel,  energy  cooperation  in  the  Mediterranean  was  developed  through  the
European  Neighborhood  Policy  (ENP),  which  –contrarily  to  the  EMP–  put  strong
emphasis on bilateral cooperation between the EU and single Mediterranean countries.
22 The ENP framework was shaped on the basis of the approach adopted with candidate
countries  prior  to  the  2004  enlargement,  and  introduced  the  possibility  for
differentiating relations with partner countries. It envisages specific incentives based
on the progress  towards commonly established benchmarks on policies  of  common
interest.23 The  tool  developed  by  the  EU  to  foster  the  dialogue  and  put  forward
cooperative programs with its neighbours is the Action Plan. Action Plans are expected to
set out the agenda for political and economic reforms in partner countries, defining
short  and  medium-term  priorities  of  3  to  5  years.  In  the  ENP  framework  energy
cooperation is basically framed along the three traditional priorities of the EU energy
policy: competitiveness and market integration, sustainability, and security of supply.
While energy cooperation is given an increasingly importance status in the ENP Action
Plans, in reality the content of these documents tends to be vague, listing only general
goals and aspirations, but without providing the practical procedures and mechanisms
to ensure their actual implementation.
23 In the specific case of North African neighbours, the EU has signed bilateral Action Plans
with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Cooperation with Egypt, in particular, is aimed at
enhancing  cooperation  in  the  energy  sector  through:  energy  policy  exchanges,  the
gradual  convergence  towards  the  principles  of  the  EU  internal  electricity  and  gas
markets,  the  development  of  energy  networks  including  facilitation  of  natural  gas
transportation  between  Egypt  and  the  EU  via  the  Arab  gas  pipeline,  regional
cooperation, and enhancing energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy as well
as cooperation in the oil and gas industry.24 Quite significantly, however, the limits of
the ENP approach are witnessed by the fact that the two key energy exporters of the
region –Algeria and Libya– have not yet agreed an Action Plan with the EU, and thus
energy cooperation with these countries remains out of the ENP framework. 
 
The bottom-up cooperation between the EU and
Mediterranean countries
24 As strategic  engagement  and ambitious  cooperation plans  failed to  deliver  tangible
results, the EU is currently trying to develop a more pragmatic bottom-up approach.25
This  effort  covers  a  wide  range  of  issues,  ranging  from  energy  legislation  and
regulatory approaches –thereby facilitating foreign investments– to energy security
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and efficiency. The aim of these is to engage neighbouring countries at the regulatory
and technical level, in order to encourage them to harmonize their procedures with
EU’s  internal  energy market  rules.  Significantly,  also the two main regional  energy
producers, Algeria and Libya, participate to these initiatives. 
25 The Association of Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MedReg),  started in 2006 as a
voluntary  working  group  to  foster  cooperation  among  regional  electricity  and  gas
regulators,  is  certainly the most successful example of regional energy cooperation.
MedReg became a permanent organisation in 2007, thanks also to the support of the
European Union, which financially sustains the association and contributes to fund its
activities through DG Energy and DG Development and Cooperation.
MedReg promotes a transparent, stable and harmonized regulatory framework in
the  Mediterranean  Region  fostering  market  integration  and  infrastructure
investments,  as  well  as  aiming  to  consumer  protection  and  enhanced  energy
cooperation.  MedReg  carries  out  its  activities  through  a  well  structured  and
effective  internal  cooperation  process  and  external  collaboration  with  energy
stakeholders  in  the  Mediterranean  Basin,  with  the  objective  to  implement  the
conditions  for  the  establishment  of  a  future  Mediterranean Energy Community,
based on a bottom-up approach.26
26 Thanks  to  the  experience  gained  with  MedReg  in  2012  the  Commission  decided  to
launch Med-TSO, a platform to coordinate the activities of Mediterranean transmission
system operators.27 Med-TSO is expected to coordinate the development plans and the
operation of the grids in Mediterranean countries, and to encourage the integration of
their electricity systems and the implementation of common criteria and harmonized,
transparent and non-discriminatory rules of access to and usage of grids. Coordination
with the EU is ensured by a direct link with the European Network of Transmission
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), while in order to speed up the integration
of the regional electricity market, Med-TSO works closely also with MedReg.
27 In October 2013 the cooperation between the two regional associations gave its first
results, as MedReg and Med-TSO signed an agreement aimed at promoting a shared
vision to integrate Mediterranean electrical markets. The institutional partnership is
expected to foster coordinated transmission rules on a regional level, to promote the
synergic development of electricity infrastructures, and to boost technical cooperation
in  critical  areas  such  as  security  and  quality.  Cooperation  to  harmonize  rules  to
coordinate  Mediterranean  electrical  markets  can  be  extended  to  other  relevant
partners, in order to develop an inclusive and unified approach to confront the region’s
challenges in the energy sector.28 In this context, MedReg and Med-TSO cooperate with
the  European  Commission  and  UfM  to  promote  multilateral  cooperation  in  the
Mediterranean region aimed at integrating regional energy systems.
28 Other relevant institutional initiatives include EU projects aimed at enhancing regional
cooperation on these topics. MED-ENEC, a EU-funded project on Energy Efficiency in
the  Construction  Sector29,  and  MED-EMIP,  a  project  supporting  the  Enhanced
Integration and the Improved Security  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market.30
Contrarily  to  MedReg  and  Med-TSO,  these  projects  do  not  directly  involve  public
stakeholders, and their practical results are so far more limited.
29 These institutional initiatives are integrated by complementary efforts put in place at
the industrial level. The most relevant of these is Medgrid, created in 2010 by a group
of utilities, grid operators and equipment makers,31 with the target of carrying out a
feasibility study of the development of a grid aimed at connecting Europe to North
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African solar electricity producers.  New interconnectors are needed throughout the
Mediterranean region to facilitate large-scale electricity trading between the north and
south, in addition to inter-grid trading throughout the region. To address this need, the
Medgrid  industrial  initiative  was  set  up  to  design  and  promote  a  Mediterranean
transmission  network  capable  of  transporting  5 GW of  electricity  to  Europe  and to
provide tools to assess infrastructure projects. The project is closely connected to the
realization of  the MSP,  whose implementation delays  are  somehow frustrating also
advancements of Medgrid initiatives.32
30 The results  achieved by these bottom-up initiatives,  the EU started considering the
possibility to extend the normative framework of the Energy Community also to its
Mediterranean partners.33 In practice,  this  process would attempt to extend the EU
internal energy policy and to create a stable regulatory and market framework beyond
South  East  Europe,  including  also  North  African  countries.34 This  would  be  a  very
ambitious objective for the EU, also considering the gradual approach and the limited
results obtained by the Energy Community so far. However, the current risks to energy
security that the EU has to face, the need of North African countries to modify their
traditional energy consumption patterns,  and the potential  windows of opportunity
opened by the change of leadership in these countries encouraged the EU to explore
this possibility.
 
Changing cooperation patterns after the Arab
uprisings?
31 So  far,  the  political  outcomes  resulted  from  the  uprisings  appear  too  limited  and
heterogeneous to imagine a radical change in the traditional energy dynamics in the
Mediterranean. The emergence of a space of democracy, economic development and
social inclusion foreseen during and in the immediate aftermath of the uprisings has
not yet materialized. Rather, in the main energy producing countries the revolts have
produced questionable and significantly different results. 
32 In Egypt, the results of the revolts –which ended in the electoral process that put Morsi
in power as President in 2012– were reversed by the counter-revolution erupted on
June 2013. Encouraged by protesters calling for Morsi’s resignation, at the beginning of
July a military coup led by Defence Minister Abdul Fatah al-Sisi declared the president
unseated,  determining  a  political  vacuum  filled  by  the  military-backed interim
government of Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi.  While the country’s energy sector
stability has emerged as one of the more pressing challenges in the period after the
revolts,  due  to  the  priority  internal  stability  issues  –in  the  last  year  the  Egyptian
government  could  do  little  to  establish  an  effective  energy  policy  action,  both
internally and externally. 
33 In Libya the situation is even worse. After the 2011 civil war and the death of Colonel
Gheddafi  and the liberation of  the country announced by the National  Transitional
Council  in  October  of  the  same  year,  the  situation  in  Libya  is  still  critical,  due  to
insurgency  led  by  former  Gheddafi  loyalists,  continuous  threats  of  secession  by
Cyrenaica authorities, and clashes between clans for the control of specific areas or
economic  activities.  While  after  Colonel  Gheddafi’s  defeat  analysts  expected  the
country  to  largely  expand  its  hydrocarbon  production,  in  reality  since  2011  the
government  is  struggling  to  ensure  unity  and  stability.  Uncertainty  and  security
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concerns affect also the energy sector –in 2013 both gas exports and crude trade were
blocked for  security  reasons–  preventing the  government  to  develop new coherent
strategies in the energy domain. 
34 Contrarily to Egypt and Libya, in Algeria the revolts did produce neither significant
political  changes,  nor  major  instability  and security  concerns.  In  terms of  political
structure, indeed, Algeria is the North African country to have undergone the least
change in the past few years. However, the fact that the Algerian regime survived this
wave of revolts does not mean that it  is  intrinsically strong and stable.  In fact,  the
regime  led  by  President  Bouteflika  is  particularly  concerned  by  the  situation  of
instability in neighbouring Libya, which could set a precedent for Algerian protesters,
but also create chaos in the region and result in further tribal secession demands on its
soil. In general, the necessity to face these challenges and to ensure the continuity of
the  regime  through  energy  revenues  has  encouraged  the  Algerian  government  to
maintain its traditional energy policies. 
35 The political conditions emerged after the Arab revolts certainly do not represent the
best  environment  for  the  EU  to  shape  new  forms  of  energy  dialogue  in  the
Mediterranean. However, contextualizing the situation in the broader regional trends,
it is possible to envisage some room for deepening the energy relations between the EU
and its North African partners. In the current transition phase, North African countries
urgently  need  to  find  a  new  path  of  strong  and  sustainable  socio-economic
development, necessary to respond to the changes invoked by the population. Energy is
a  fundamental  factor  to  respond  to  this  challenge,  as  it  affects  the  main
macroeconomic  parameters  of  the  countries,  including  fiscal  balances  and  poverty
trends.35
36 The  picture  is  characterised  by  a  rapid  increase  of  energy  demand,  low  energy
efficiency  and  low  domestic  energy  prices  due  to  large  subsidies  on  energy
consumption.  Due  to  rapid  population  growth,  urbanisation  and  economic  growth,
these  countries  are  “under  strong  pressure  to  increase  investment  in  new  energy
facilities  as  well  as  finance  costly  energy  subsidies.  In  short,  the  current  energy
situation does not appear sustainable and poses several risks to the prospects of socio-
economic development of  the region”.36 The current situation in Egypt is  a  case in
point: with declining gas production and energy subsidies that account to up a fifth of
the budget, the government has been forced to import for the first time coal to help
power  the  struggling  concrete  industry  as  well  as  to  raise  prices  for  home  use  of
natural gas, in some cases quadrupling its cost to the citizens.37 Given these conditions,
a reform of the energy sectors in these countries –both source of necessary income and
of socio-economic inequalities– is urgent, in particular in view of the future economic
and demographic regional trends.
37 In this context, the EU represents the best partner to work with in order to launch
sectorial  reforms  that  should  address  policy  planning,  legal  and  regulatory  design,
infrastructure  development,  and  technological  transfers.  Due  to  the  strong
complementarities  and  the  proximity  of  the  markets,  closer  Mediterranean
cooperation  in  this  domain  provides  important  dividends  to  both  the  EU  and  its
regional partners, as far as energy security, sustainable development, economic growth
and job creation are concerned. The results reached by bottom-up Euro-Mediterranean
cooperation show this approach may represent an important option to achieve these
objectives.
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38 Despite these possible virtuous evolutions, the political changes in the region may also
represent  a  significant  challenge  for  the  EU.  At  the  theoretical  level,  the  new
leaderships could be tempted to explore other forms of energy cooperation with new
international partners. In this context of increasing overture, global energy players such
as the US, China, Russia, Brazil and the Gulf countries could take the opportunity to
establish closer partnership in the region. This argument became particularly popular
during the 2011 military intervention in Libya to overturn Col. Gheddafi, which was
justified by part of the public opinion as a move to open the country’s energy sector to
international energy companies.38 In reality, due to the political and security concerns
mentioned  above,  this  situation  has  not  yet  materialized  and  those  countries  with
traditional experience in Libya still remain key actors in its energy sectors. 
39 More than the effects of the Arab uprisings, also in this case is the regional energy
context that may play a significant role in the evolution of the Mediterranean relations.
Algeria, the least affected by the political changes occurred in North Africa, is a case in
point.  The  Algerian  government,  indeed,  is  intensively  attempting  to  diversify  its
exports  options to cope with the declining energy demand in the EU markets.  The
regime  has  clearly  expressed  its  interest  in  exploring  new  markets,  and  started
considering to expand LNG sales in Asia –where spot prices are significantly higher
than in Europe– and South America.39
40 In conclusion, given the current situation in North Africa, it is rather difficult to expect
the sole outcomes of the Arab uprisings to play a major role in determining significant
transformations in the regional energy relations. However, considering the emerging
energy trends at the national, regional and global level, some of the political and social
processes activated by the revolts may contribute to mutate the traditional cooperation
paradigms. In this evolving context, the EU could take the opportunity to deepen its
energy  dialogue  with  these  countries  and  strengthen  its  energy  security  policies.
However,  if  not  played  with  coherence  and  supported  by  its  Member  States,  such
leading  role  in  the  region  may  be  challenged  by  the  potential  emergence  of  new
international energy competitors in the Mediterranean space.
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ABSTRACTS
The revolts spread across the Mediterranean region between 2010 and 2011, have introduced a
series  of  political,  socio-economic  and  security  changes  that  could  impact  on  the  nature  of
energy relations in the region. During the last decades, indeed, regional energy cooperation has
been based on strong bilateral ties between the regimes in place in energy producing countries
and a limited group of southern European states, leaving limited room for the active engagement
of the EU in this domain. While so far the changes triggered by the protests have had partial
impact  on  the  traditional  intergovernmental  energy  cooperation  models  in  place  in  the
Mediterranean –if  coupled with energy trends emerging at  the national,  regional  and global
level– they could eventually contribute to create a new energy paradigm in the region. 
Les révoltes se sont diffusées à travers l’aire méditerranéenne entre 2010 et 2011 ont introduit
une  série  de  changements  politiques,  socio-économiques  et  sécuritaires  qui  ont  pu  avoir  un
impact sur la nature des relations énergétiques dans la région. Au cours des dernières décennies,
la coopération énergétique régionale a été basée sur des liens bilatéraux forts entre les régimes
en place dans les pays producteurs d’énergie et un petit groupe d’États du Sud de l’Europe, qui
ont laissé peu de place à un engagement actif de l’Union européenne dans ce domaine. Alors que
jusqu’à présent, les changements déclenchés par les révoltes ont eu un certain impact sur les
modèles  intergouvernementaux  traditionnels  de  coopération  énergétique  en  usage  en
Méditerranée – s’ils étaient couplés avec les tendances émergentes au niveau national, régional
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et global –, ils pourraient en définitive contribuer à créer un nouveau modèle énergétique dans la
région.
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